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Abstract 
This paper uses a tri-variate structural VAR with a long-run identification scheme, akin to the 
Blanchard and Quah method, to identify external and domestic supply and demand shocks in 22 
African countries between 1980 and 2005. Domestic supply shocks are found to be the most 
important factor contributing over 70% to output fluctuations in these countries, with external 
shocks playing a relatively minor role. A partial correlation analysis between the identified shocks 
and a measure of the fiscal policies of the countries revealed that the fiscal policies pursued by most 
of the countries during the period are counter-cyclical. 
JEL Classification: E62, F41, F43 
Key Words: African countries; Structural VAR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper contributes to the on-going debate over the disappointing economic performance of 
many African countries over recent decades with respect to economic growth (see, for example, 
Easterly and Levine, 1997), by focusing on the identification of the sources of the economic shocks 
faced by these economies between 1980 and 2005, in order to examine the country-specific 
constraints on economic growth and potential policy options.   
Despite the optimism about Africa’s economic potential in the 1960s and early 1970s (Enke, 1963; 
Kamark, 1976) for most African countries, the 1980s are considered as ‘a lost decade’ with slow, and 
even negative, growth commonplace (Fisher, 1991). For example, in 1957 Ghana, then the 
wealthiest nation in sub-Saharan Africa, had a per capita income almost equal to that of South Korea 
(US$ 490 against US$ 491 in 1980 dollars), but by the early 1980s, Ghana’s annual income per head 
had fallen by nearly 20 per cent to US$400, while South Korea’s per capita GDP was, by then, over 
US$ 2,000. The UNDP’s 1990 Human Development Report suggests that South Korea had an annual 
purchasing power per head ten times greater than Ghana (US$ 4,832 against US$ 481) based on 
1987 statistics (The Economist, 26 May, 1990, p.81). Furthermore this was not just a country-specific 
problem, but an African problem. Collier and Gunning (1999), for example, note that African 
economic performance had been markedly worse than that of other regions, during the 1980s as per 
capita GDP declined by 1.3 percent per annum, five percent below the average for all low income 
developing countries. During 1990-94 the decline accelerated to 1.8 percent per annum which, 
widened up the gap between the average of all low income countries to 6.2 percent. Since the mid-
1990s economic performance in Africa seems to have been improving, with GDP growth in sub-
Saharan Africa rising to about six percent per annum, while inflation has been in single digits, a much 
improved performance perhaps partly attributable to structural adjustment programmes sponsored 
by the IMF and the World Bank.   
To identify the potential economic shocks faced by the African countries since 1980 we undertake a 
tri-variate VAR analysis, following Dungey and Pagan (2000). For small open economies, like those in 
Africa, where external shocks are likely to be at least as important as domestic shocks in influencing 
the evolution of output growth and inflation, the tri-variate VAR is preferred to Blanchard and 
Quah’s (1989) more usual bi-variate VAR. In this framework in addition to domestic output growth 
and inflation, world output growth is also included in the model. This variable is assumed to be an 
important exogenous determinant of individual country exports, and therefore fluctuations in world 
output growth are likely to have significant effects on domestic output growth and inflation.  A 
second contribution to the existing literature is to identify the contribution of national fiscal policies 
by a partial correlation analysis between the estimated shocks and a measure of fiscal policies of the 
countries studied.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses the identification of 
aggregate supply and demand shocks within a structural VAR. Section 3 analyses the data from our 
sample of 22 African countries and the results from the trivariate-VAR analysis. Section 4 concludes. 
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2. Aggregate Supply and Demand Shocks within an SVAR 
The SVAR methodology imposes structural restrictions, based on economic theory (Hoffmaister et al 
1998), on a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. In particular, in a bi-variate VAR context, Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) interpret the permanent shocks as aggregate supply shocks and transitory shocks 
as aggregate demand shocks. In an open economy context, a third-order VAR is necessary to capture 
potential shocks from the rest of the world on domestic output growth and inflation (Dungey and 
Pagan, 2000).  
Therefore let ݕ௧∗,ݕ௧ and ߨ௧  represent the log of real foreign output, the log of real domestic output 
and the domestic inflation rate, respectively. Then a tri-variate autoregressive (VAR) model can be 
set up to represent the small open economies of Africa as follows: 
∆ݕ௧
∗ = ∑ ܽଵଵ௝∆ݕ௧ି௝∗௞௝ୀଵ + ݁ଵ௧                                                                                                (1) 
∆ݕ௧ = ∑ ܽଶଵ௝∆ݕ௧ି௝∗௞௝ୀ଴ + ∑ ܽଶଶ௝∆ݕ௧ି௝௞௝ୀଵ + ∑ ܽଶଶ௝∆ߨ௧ିଵ + ݁ଶ௧௞௝ୀଵ                                       (2) 
∆ߨ௧ = ∑ ܽଶଵ௝∆௞௝ୀ଴ ݕ௧ି௝∗ + ∑ ܽଶଶ௝∆ݕ௧ି௝ + ∑ ܽଶଷ௝௞௝ୀଵ௞௝ୀଵ ∆ߨ௝ି௜ + ݁ଷ௧                                       (3) 
where the constant terms are suppressed for notational convenience and the variables are 
differenced sufficiently to achieve stationarity. If the domestic economy is assumed to be small, then 
it is reasonable to assume that this economy has no effect on the world output, and therefore the 
foreign output equation includes neither current or lagged values of the other variables. The small 
country assumption also means that domestic output and inflation are allowed to depend on the 
current and past values of foreign output. The residuals ݁ଵ௧, ݁ଶ௧ and ݁ଷ௧ are assumed to be related to 
each other through different types of shocks, which are foreign shocks, ݒ௧, domestic demand shocks,  
ߟ௧  and domestic supply shocks, ߝ௧ . Since these shocks are not observable, they need to be identified 
from the VAR residuals. Let the relationship between the residuals and the innovations be given by 
൥
݁ଵ௧
݁ଶ௧
݁ଷ௧
൩ = ൥ ଵ݃ଵ ଵ݃ଶ ଵ݃ଷ݃ଶଵ ݃ଶଶ ݃ଶଷ
݃ଷଵ ݃ଷଶ ݃ଷଷ
൩ ൥
ݒ௧
ߝ௧
ߟ௧
൩                                                                                     (4) 
In the above system, there are fifteen unknowns to identify. These are nine elements, gij , of matrix 
G linking the VAR residuals and the structural innovations, three variances σ2v , σ2ε , σ2η and three 
covariances σ2v ε , σ2ε η , σ2ηv  in the variance-covariance matrix, Σ, of the structural innovations. From 
equation (4) the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR residuals Σe is denoted by 
Σ௘ = ܩΣ௦ܩᇱ                                                                                                                              (5) 
The elements of Σ௘ provides six of the fifteen restrictions required for exact identification of the 
system. In addition, following the Blanchard-Quah methodology, it is assumed that all variances are 
unity, i.e. ߪ௩ଶ = ߪఌଶ = ߪఎଶ 	= 1 and all co-variances are zero, ߪ௩ఌଶ = ߪఌఎଶ = ߪఎ௩ଶ = 0.  The penultimate 
two restrictions are that the domestic supply shocks εt and domestic demand shocks ηt have no 
impact on the large country, so that both g₁₂ and g₁3 are zero. Finally, domestic demand shocks have 
no long-run effects on domestic output, so that: 
 ݃ଶଷൣ1 − ∑ ܽଷଷ௝௞ଵୀଵ ൧ + ݃ଷଷൣ1 − ∑ ܽଶଷ௝௞௜ୀଵ ൧ = 0                                                                                                   (6) 
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These restrictions are adequate to identify the structural system. Impulse response functions and  
variance decomposition analysis of the output effects of the structural shocks are considered with 
the view to investigate the plausibility of the identification presented here. 
Given that the domestic country is assumed to be small, world output growth is taken to be 
exogenous and therefore, domestic shocks do not affect world output. A positive shock to foreign 
growth, however, perhaps from a global technological improvement, would raise domestic output 
growth through two possible channels. There would be a direct effect of higher demand for home 
exports as world income rose and an indirect effect, through a more favourable terms of trade for 
the home country as import prices fall relative to export prices. A positive domestic supply shock 
directly and permanently increases output. As long-run neutrality of aggregate demand is assumed 
demand shocks have no effect on the long-run path of domestic supply.  
 
3. African growth: response to external and internal shocks 
3.1 The Data Set 
To estimate the SVAR model quarterly data is obtained from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics database, covering the period from 1980Q1 to 2005Q4 and comprises of foreign (or world) 
real GDP plus domestic real GDP and the consumer prices indices (CPI) for each of the 22 African 
countries in the sample. Foreign real GDP is represented by US output, which is highly and 
significantly correlated with world output (correlation coefficient of 0.73). The time series were first 
logged and then subjected to a battery of unit root tests that included the ADF, PP and KPSS tests to 
identify their level of integration. Table 1 shows that the tests rejected the stationarity of the series 
in levels, but failed to reject stationarity in first differences. In addition, Table 1 also reports 
Johansen cointegration tests between the logarithms of domestic prices, domestic GDP, and foreign 
GDP for each country, and  shows that there is no cointegration and therefore the use of the SVAR 
methodology is appropriate for each of the sample countries. 
3.2  SVAR Results     
The impulse response functions show the direction, magnitude and time path of domestic output 
growth and inflation from shocks emanating from world output, domestic demand and domestic 
supply. Figure 1 shows these GDP growth and inflation profiles for each of the 22 countries, where 
the dotted lines denote the five per cent confidence bands.  
Output growth of these countries does not seem to be very sensitive to the positive external shock 
from world GDP growth. This maybe a reflection of the general movement towards more flexible 
exchange rates (see Ahmad, et al 2011 and Alba, et al 2011) by many of these economies, so 
providing them with greater insulation from real foreign shocks. In fact only three countries' output 
responded to the world GDP shock: Botswana, Central Africa, and to a lesser extent, Egypt. This 
effect is probably due to the structure of these countries exports. For example, Botswana's and 
Central African Republic’s main exports are diamonds, the demand for which is likely to be sensitive 
to income growth in the industrial countries and Egypt is increasingly becoming an important gold 
exporting country. Jin, et al (1994) reported similar findings for Korea in the 1990s. For some 
countries, such as Ethiopia and Nigeria the positive world output shock lead to an initial fall in 
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domestic growth which persisted until the tenth quarter and sixth quarter after the shock, 
respectively. Similar results are reported by Ahmed and Park (1994) for a set of developed countries. 
With the exception of Gabon, world output shocks had no effect on domestic inflation. In Gabon 
inflation rises at a diminishing rate for ten quarters, to be 10% higher than before the shock.  
 A positive domestic supply shock results, as expected, in a persistent rise in the growth of real 
output from the period contemporaneous to the shock up to the tenth quarter in all the countries. 
The magnitude, however, varies from country to country. Zambia, for example, recorded a 3% 
positive response during the period immediately after the shock,  whereas Gabon, Ghana, Libya, 
Malawi, Mauritania and Tanzania’s output responded by a 2% rise in the period contemporaneous to 
the shock. The rest of the countries recorded a rise of about 1% in output due to the domestic 
supply shock, except for Egypt, Mauritius and Tunisia, where the immediate response to the shock 
was less than 0.5%. The degree of persistence also varies among the countries. In Algeria, Botswana, 
Gabon, Ghana, Libya, Malawi and Tanzania, the response of the output was to rise by between 3% 
and 4% by the second or sixth quarter, where it mostly remained until the tenth quarter. The effect 
of the domestic supply shock on inflation rates was small, although this result may also reflect the 
role of price distortions in some of these economies. Countries that operate some form of price 
control, such as Benin, Cameroon, Central Africa, Gabon and Senegal, recorded a rise in inflation in 
response to a positive shock to domestic supply. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Ghana and 
Tunisia, where there are few price controls, did record a decline inflation of between 1% and 1.5% as 
a result of a positive domestic supply shock, albeit in some cases insignificant. 
A positive domestic demand shock has no permanent effect on real GDP in most of the sample 
countries, the exceptions being Benin and Senegal, where output growth, although very small is 
sustained for over ten quarters.  The demand shock, however, has a much greater effect on inflation, 
inducing an immediate, positive and significant rise in inflation in all the countries, except Gabon. 
For most countries the rise in inflation is between 1% and 2%, although in three countries – Ghana, 
Malawi and Zambia it is very much higher. In Ghana inflation rises immediately by 2% and is 10% 
higher ten quarters later and on a rising trend. In Malawi inflation jumps immediately by 2.5% ad is 
7.5% higher after ten quarters and still rising. In Zambia inflation jumps immediately by 15% and 
remains about 15% higher after ten quarters. 
 Impulse response analysis is useful in considering the signs and magnitude of responses to specific 
shocks, however, the relative importance of shocks for given variable fluctuations is better assessed 
through the variance decompositions. Table 2 presents the variance decomposition of real output 
and inflation to world GDP and domestic supply and demand shocks. Foreign shocks have not 
significantly impacted on the domestic output of these countries, except in Egypt, Gabon and Ghana 
where the foreign shock accounted for more than 10% of domestic output variations. Gabon 
recorded the highest of 14% after three years. The domestic supply shock is by far the most 
important source of domestic real output variation in all the 22 countries, however, its relative 
significance seems to decline over time in some countries. For example, in Nigeria and Senegal, the 
supply shocks initially accounted for about 99% of output fluctuations, but its contribution in both 
countries declined to about 68% after six years. The influence of demand shocks on domestic output 
varies across the countries, but its relative importance is generally low, accounting for less than 20% 
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of output variations in all the countries, except in Senegal where the influence of the demand shock 
on output is about 30%. 
The most important source of inflation is the demand shock, which accounts for between 50% and 
90% of inflation variation in all countries, with the exception of Gabon. The country where the 
demand shock has the largest influence on inflation is Zambia, where demand shocks accounts for 
between 100% and 96% of the variation in inflation. In general the external world output shock has 
had rather less impact on inflation variation in most of the countries, with the exceptions of Gabon 
and South Africa, accounting for between 3% and 7% of their inflation variation. For Gabon, external 
shocks initially account for 98% of the inflation variation, before falling to about 80% after three 
years. South African inflation variation is also highly dependent on foreign output shocks, which 
account for 21% of inflation variation after two years.  This level of external dependence is probably 
explained by the fact that South Africa's largest trading partner, accounting for about a third of her 
exports and imports, is the USA. The contribution to inflation of domestic supply shocks varies from 
one country to another. In Algeria, Central Africa, Benin, Ethiopia, Malawi and Senegal, between 
20% and over 40% of variations in inflation are attributable to the domestic supply shocks. Domestic 
supply shocks are, however, responsible for less than 10% of inflation in Botswana, Egypt, Kenya, 
Libya, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nigeria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.   
3.3 Fiscal policy 
Given the impact of the three shocks on inflation and domestic output growth, it is also interesting 
to consider the possible impact fiscal policy has had on eliminating or magnifying the impact of such 
shocks. In order to undertake this kind of analysis, a measure of the fiscal is needed. In this regard 
we follow Kaminsky et al (2004) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008), where fiscal policy is measured from 
the perspective of the potential instruments of fiscal policy, rather than from the outcomes (which 
could lie outside the policy makers' control). Since data on tax rates are not available, or indeed a 
reliable measure of the tax burden in developing countries, government consumption is used as the 
measure of the fiscal policy stance. The variable is sourced from the Worldbank Development 
Indicators database. 
A partial correlation analysis between the estimated shocks and government consumption are 
reported in Table 3, which shows that for the majority of countries fiscal policy is counter-cyclical 
(see also Diallo, 2009), as indicated by negative and significant correlation coefficients between the 
demand shock and the government consumption.  Of the 22 countries, 19 show negative correlation 
coefficients (four of which are not statistically significant at the 10% level), while three, Central 
Africa, Gabon and Morocco are positive (between 0.22 and 0.46) and significant.  The most counter-
cyclical fiscal policy countries seem to be Malawi and Mauritius, with correlation coefficients of -0.95 
and -0.76 respectively. The relationship between domestic supply shocks and fiscal policy is usually 
positive (20 out of 22 countries) and statistically significant. The two exceptions are Central Africa 
and Morocco, with partial correlation coefficients of -0.26 and -0.44 respectively, both of which are 
significant at the 5% per cent level. This suggests that in most countries government consumption 
rises with positive output shocks, suggesting that much of the additional supply is bought up by the 
public sector, rather than by the private sector.  
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4. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the effects of external, demand and supply shocks on output growth and 
inflation in 22 African countries. On the whole, domestic supply shocks are by far the most 
important of the shocks in accounting for between 70% and 95% of movements in domestic output. 
This finding may suggest that economic policies that aim at alleviating country-specific supply-side 
constraints would most likely help in raising the economies' rate of economic growth.  
 Foreign supply shocks have produced positive and significant output responses in Botswana, Egypt, 
Gabon, and Tunisia, perhaps reflecting the importance of solid minerals in these countries’ exports. 
Domestic demand shocks did not produce any significant response in real output, except in Senegal 
and Benin, although inflation did respond positively to the demand shocks in almost all the 
countries. 
Finally, a partial correlation analysis between domestic supply and demand shocks and government 
consumption, used as a measure of the countries’ fiscal stance, indicated that fiscal policy 
undertaken by these countries during the sample period was primarily counter-cyclical, and that 
extra output produced as a result of a positive supply shock was largely absorbed by the public 
sector.  
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Figure 1. Impulse Responses 
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(3) Botswana 
Real GDP Responses 
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(5) Central Africa 
Real GDP Responses 
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(7) Ethiopia 
Real GDP Responses 
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(9) Ghana 
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(11) Libya 
Real GDP Responses 
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(13)Mauritania 
Real GDP Responses 
  
 
Inflation Responses 
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(15) Morocco 
Real GDP Responses 
   
Inflation Responses 
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(17) Senegal 
Real GDP Responses 
   
Inflation Responses 
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Real GDP Responses 
   
Inflation Responses 
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(19) Tanzania 
Real GDP Responses 
   
Inflation Responses 
   
(20) Tunisia  
Real GDP Responses 
   
Inflation Responses 
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(21) Uganda 
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Table 1 
Unit Root and Johansen Cointegration Tests 
No. Country Variables 
ADF PP KPSS 
Johansen 
Cointegration Tests± 
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Trace 
Maximum 
Eigenvalues 
1. Algeria LGDP -1.39 -2.92
** -2.16 -8.24** 1.14# 0.12 
20.75 11.23 
LCPI -1.66 -2.98** -0.16 -7.39** 1.08 # 0.25 
2. Benin LGDP -0.77 -2.91
** -0.8  -7.40 ** 1.12# 0.10  
28.23 18.58 
LCPI -2.69 -8.44** -2.53  -21.85** 2.02# 0.00  
3. Botswana LGDP -1.62 -5.01
** -1.20 -8.35** 1.13# 0.20 
28.13 16.55 
LCPI -1.59 -6.07** -2.89 -10.68** 0.47# 0.12 
4. Cameroun LGDP -1.89 -2.93
** -1.97 -7.75** 1.12# 0.20 
22.50 12.66 
LCPI -0.83 -6.95** 0.82 -6.94** 1.12# 0.08 
5. Central Africa LGDP -1.78 -4.68
** -2.34 -6.55** 1.22# 0.26 
20.99 14.19 
LCPI -1.06 -6.83** 0.83 -6.82** 1.12# 0.06 
6. Egypt LGDP -1.03 -3.05
** -1.29 -10.26** 1.14# 0.16 
23.40 13.04 
LCPI -1.31 -6.68** -1.35 -6.79** 1.14 0.32 
7. Ethiopia LGDP -0.75 -3.50
** -0.74 -7.60** 1.15# 0.16 
25.30 17.41 
LCPI -0.74 -4.53** -0.58 -7.37** 1.23# 0.14 
8. Gabon LGDP -0.48 -4.34
** -0.61 -6.70** 1.19# 0.05 
27.12 17.83 
LCPI -1.59 -6.69** -1.65 -6.73** 1.12# 0.09 
9. Ghana LGDP -0.65 -4.32
** -0.64 -5.52** 0.90# 0.14 
28.39 20.85 
LCPI 3.41 -3.95** 7.96 -5.42** 1.02# 0.31 
10. Kenya LGDP -1.51 -4.76
** -1.22 -8.51** 1.14# 0.22 
26.31 16.89 
LCPI -1.49 -7.65** -1.39 -7.63** 1.17# 0.06 
11. Libya LGDP 1.42 -4.00
** -0.32 -7.35** 1.15# 0.04 
23.50 16.24 
LCPI -1.82 -2.94** -1.75 -7.70** 1.07# 0.03 
12. Malawi LGDP 0.28 -3.85
** 0.58 -8.43** 1.13# 0.22 
21.46 13.54 
LCPI -0.72 -4.71** 5.73 -8.78** 1.01# 0.23 
13. Mauritania LGDP -0.35 -4.10
** -0.01 -8.24** 1.15# 0.05 
19.78 14.21 
LCPI 2.08 -8.69** 1.98 -8.79** 1.20# 0.32 
14. Mauritius LGDP -0.30 -4.32
** -0.86 -12.26** 1.14# 0.11 
18.26 12.93 
LCPI 3.78 -7.70** 3.18 -8.02** 1.13# 0.21 
15. Morocco LGDP -1.26 -4.77
** -0.89 -9.67** 1.11# 0.04 
25.17 18.18 
LCPI -2.46 -9.60** -2.63 -9.64** 1.13# 0.09 
16 Nigeria LGDP 0.23 -3.18
** 1.03 -6.33** 1.07# 0.42 
28.96 16.47 
LCPI 0.50 -8.57** 0.56 -8.49** 1.12# 0.07 
17 Senegal LGDP 0.35 -3.79
** -0.01 -7.40** 1.24# 0.09 
21.87 14.44 
LCPI -1.25 -8.54** -1.22 -8.63** 1.18# 0.09 
18 South Africa LGDP -2.76 -3.79
** -2.41 -7.39** 1.24# 0.07 
24.19 14.81 
LCPI -2.87 -5.47** -2.04 -5.13** 1.13# 0.01 
19 Tanzania LGDP -1.90 -4.28
** -1.46 -8.60** 1.12# 0.30 
22.42 14.97 
LCPI -2.69 -5.18** 0.93 -10.14** 1.08# 0.32 
20 Tunisia LGDP 1.10 -4.08
** 1.06 -8.58** 1.14# 0.22 
19.67 11.72 
LCPI -0.65 -4.83** -0.56 -5.12** 1.19# 0.12 
21 Uganda LGDP -0.86 -3.08
** -0.39 -7.86** 1.10# 0.09 
27.63 17.98 
LCPI 0.79 -8.28** 0.57 -8.35** 1.11# 0.27 
22 Zambia LGDP -1.66 -6.08
** -0.56 -8.75** 1.12# 0.20 
27.92 20.58 
LCPI 0.49 -9.08** -0.39 -9.09** 1.15# 0.23 
**  and # signify rejection of the null at 5% level of significance.  
±The tests have failed to reject the null of no cointegration at 5% significance level in all the countries. 
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Table 2 
Variance Decompositions 
(1) Algeria 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(2) Benin 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 0.697599 99.30240 0.000000 0.135179 99.86482 0.000000 
4 1.319167 95.81604 2.864796 1.123328 86.74560 12.13107 
8 1.121261 94.82389 4.054847 3.661426 83.33741 13.00117 
12 0.974957 93.65991 5.365129 3.730439 82.21944 14.05013 
20 0.848007 91.06307 8.088923 3.738947 82.15733 14.10372 
30 0.796416 89.11219 10.09139 3.755063 82.03315 14.21178 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 1.314343 0.404809 98.28085 3.352159 0.383648 96.26419 
4 1.912087 3.802834 94.28508 3.391468 26.16956 70.43898 
8 2.096226 11.47596 86.42781 3.096229 35.58237 61.32140 
12 2.159426 16.84905 80.99153 3.308824 35.62448 61.06669 
20 2.077913 21.46978 76.45231 3.315946 35.96312 60.72094 
30 1.999664 23.84811 74.15223 3.318753 35.98966 60.69158 
(3) Botswana 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(4) Cameroon 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 3.139049 96.86095 0.000000 0.152395 99.84760 0.000000 
4 8.959465 86.92816 4.112373 2.450423 96.08224 1.467342 
8 8.157334 83.34474 8.497930 2.936212 93.66187 3.401922 
12 8.022418 84.54211 7.435471 3.099937 92.44003 4.460034 
20 8.071869 84.96298 6.965149 3.262621 91.57599 5.161386 
30 8.018019 85.30063 6.681352 3.310156 91.36872 5.321122 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 1.728150 0.223229 98.04862 0.760715 0.062224 99.17706 
4 4.632431 4.455278 90.91229 2.392645 3.072200 94.53516 
8 6.337457 5.090593 88.57195 3.831946 7.019245 89.14881 
12 6.770689 5.064453 88.16486 4.277224 8.284746 87.43803 
20 6.994070 5.145714 87.86022 4.312025 8.726697 86.96128 
30 7.015931 5.157453 87.82662 4.309978 8.854381 86.83564 
(5) Central Africa Republic 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(6) Egypt 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 2.154552 97.84545 0.000000 1.189876 98.81012 0.000000 
4 2.464903 93.89102 3.644080 5.778992 91.18669 3.034320 
8 5.944772 88.48952 5.565709 11.61283 80.78628 7.600884 
12 6.074277 88.12934 5.796381 11.68917 80.89487 7.415963 
20 6.305047 87.84564 5.849310 11.89244 80.65995 7.447611 
30 6.323049 87.82361 5.853340 11.97479 80.59596 7.429252 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1 0.738759 0.442552 98.81869 0.048876 0.013569 99.93756 
4 1.750316 26.32616 71.92352 0.119168 7.888055 91.99278 
8 3.067606 27.83053 69.10186 1.731025 9.046626 89.22235 
12 4.721425 28.33871 66.93987 2.129253 9.465143 88.40560 
20 4.866925 28.56622 66.56686 2.221445 9.820932 87.95762 
30 4.883234 28.58933 66.52743 2.251901 9.920681 87.82742 
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Table 2 contd 
Variance Decompositions 
(7) Ethiopia 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(8) Gabon 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.479377 99.52062 0.000000 0.129712 99.87029 0.000000 
4 8.352452 89.49849 2.149060 2.598500 97.09914 0.302362 
8 7.513766 86.24275 6.243487 12.61881 84.34973 3.031462 
12 6.514348 85.62970 7.855956 13.86917 82.35359 3.777237 
20 5.911580 84.26661 9.821813 14.44197 81.66495 3.893079 
30 5.600261 83.74670 10.65304 14.47827 81.61639 3.905349 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.287772 0.188646 99.52358 98.20162 0.007283 1.791096 
4 2.414337 7.913673 89.67199 85.02673 11.25738 3.715884 
8 3.797290 13.64155 82.56116 81.99757 13.97521 4.027224 
12 5.575889 15.05473 79.36938 80.14147 15.76745 4.091085 
20 5.519622 17.95117 76.52921 79.40028 16.39592 4.203797 
30 5.405677 19.64493 74.94939 79.37767 16.41640 4.205926 
(9) Ghana 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(10) Kenya 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.948023 99.05198 0.000000  0.409052  99.59095  0.000000 
4 8.157540 91.04738 0.795084  0.371236  99.22212  0.406640 
8 11.59851 85.84332 2.558164  1.611625  95.89511  2.493262 
12 11.16919 82.76995 6.060863  1.781171  95.23749  2.981342 
20 11.02019 80.46502 8.514792  1.729888  95.07788  3.192232 
30 11.04960 79.38328 9.567118  1.677671  95.01054  3.311785 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.012081  0.988645  98.99927  6.619090  0.009465  93.37145 
4  3.514152  7.484227  89.00162  8.119859  1.788591  90.09155 
8  6.340093  11.69651  81.96340  9.843909  3.389220  86.76687 
12  7.191480  12.97630  79.83222  10.33944  5.291002  84.36956 
20  7.239602  13.29020  79.47020  10.17049  7.170474  82.65904 
30  7.279925  13.48217  79.23791  10.07751  8.436345  81.48615 
(11) Libya 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(12) Malawi 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks 
Supply Shocks Demand 
Shocks 
US GDP Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.379312  99.62069  0.000000  0.089157  99.91084  0.000000 
4  1.834764  97.92614  0.239100  0.327360  95.70023  3.972406 
8  3.290019  92.54507  4.164909  1.141665  94.93488  3.923451 
12  3.399166  88.75001  7.850828  1.228336  94.37930  4.392364 
20  3.664106  86.29047  10.04543  1.363493  92.63320  6.003304 
30  3.764561  85.52276  10.71268  1.415634  89.99254  8.591830 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.456643  0.104375  99.43898  0.000832  4.182117  95.81705 
4  5.088087  0.448835  94.46308  1.098662  5.236041  93.66530 
8  6.527052  0.507621  92.96533  1.272701  7.951434  90.77586 
12  7.524410  0.661936  91.81365  1.397055  10.39482  88.20813 
20  8.250193  1.055560  90.69425  1.619632  15.51283  82.86754 
30  8.292084  1.379007  90.32891  1.922339  21.01767  77.05999 
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Table 2 contd 
Variance Decompositions 
(13) Mauritania 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(14) Mauritius 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.341140  99.65886  0.000000  1.650680  98.34932  0.000000 
4  0.285520  97.32375  2.390734  1.439080  98.09559  0.465330 
8  0.329365  96.93890  2.731730  0.917985  98.31001  0.772006 
12  0.342350  96.84188  2.815767  0.913677  98.06674  1.019579 
20  0.342441  96.82494  2.832623  0.893354  97.94582  1.160822 
30  0.342566  96.82009  2.837345  0.871667  97.91429  1.214042 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.242112  0.041890  99.71600  5.892880  4.058424  90.04870 
4  1.186943  3.776650  95.03641  7.667576  5.215885  87.11654 
8  1.298330  5.096483  93.60519  7.821074  7.016395  85.16253 
12  1.297166  5.512266  93.19057  8.396674  7.193949  84.40938 
20  1.294359  5.766615  92.93903  8.374595  7.292513  84.33289 
30  1.294100  5.793982  92.91192  8.372648  7.363108  84.26424 
(15) Morocco 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(16) Nigeria 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.060205  99.93979  0.000000  0.183057  99.81694  0.000000 
4  0.599076  96.87550  2.525420  3.775915  95.05124  1.172844 
8  6.277502  90.80418  2.918315  9.732592  79.88312  10.38428 
12  5.946612  91.06283  2.990558  9.303063  70.73596  19.96098 
20  5.651234  91.26708  3.081684  9.260990  69.70403  21.03498 
30  5.415327  91.49998  3.084696  9.039772  67.81870  23.14153 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1  0.114766  2.535742  97.34949  0.001189  0.022156  99.97665 
4 1.203512  3.337419  95.45907  0.938649  5.660758  93.40059 
8  2.793708  3.999742  93.20655  2.342962  7.760214  89.89682 
12  2.977792  5.100876  91.92133  2.695416  9.849148  87.45544 
20  3.047471  6.072823  90.87971  2.527979  9.338862  88.13316 
30  3.048741  6.582463  90.36880  2.409436  9.622358  87.96821 
(17) Senegal 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(18) South Africa 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.259468 99.74053 0.000000 1.120657 98.87934 0.000000 
4 0.223169 82.85547 16.92137 1.139210 94.32366 4.537125 
8 2.193185 74.13200 23.67482 2.474951 90.07819 7.446864 
12 2.564259 71.14698 26.28876 2.622265 88.72255 8.655189 
20 2.486433 68.90421 28.60936 2.536647 88.23583 9.227519 
30 2.428857 68.03732 29.53382 2.528947 88.11764 9.353412 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks Demand Shocks 
1 0.502992 2.842035 96.65497 1.218182 0.009633 98.77218 
4 2.873270 39.65645 57.47028 18.73362 1.758078 79.50830 
8 4.965927 40.35368 54.68039 21.95426 4.570347 73.47540 
12 4.823426 41.75256 53.42401 20.90553 6.176654 72.91781 
20 4.626647 42.02510 53.34826 21.07563 6.653437 72.27094 
30 4.520969 42.07036 53.40868 21.05664 6.749669 72.19370 
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Table 2 contd 
Variance Decompositions 
(19) Tanzania 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(20) Tunisia 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.267935  99.73206  0.000000  0.177848  99.82215  0.000000 
4  0.235151  99.67094  0.093909  1.716712  97.81600  0.467286 
8  0.464650  99.42163  0.113725  7.262075  86.36504  6.372888 
12  0.469849  99.41750  0.112648  7.446272  86.47764  6.076086 
20  0.404623  99.43677  0.158602  7.150791  87.03960  5.809606 
30  0.363671  99.34512  0.291212  7.101498  87.44934  5.449165 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.243317  0.304568  99.45211  1.782702  0.000271  98.21703 
4  3.461808  0.153008  96.38518  1.972222  2.922940  95.10484 
8  2.831523  0.413912  96.75456  2.893487  7.738044  89.36847 
12  2.507026  1.062736  96.43024  3.032093  10.30799  86.65991 
20  2.212598  3.434465  94.35294  3.275172  10.76633  85.95849 
30  1.985756  7.228150  90.78609  3.330233  11.54321  85.12655 
(21) Uganda 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
(22) Zambia 
Variance Decomposition of GDP Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.051005  99.94899  0.000000  1.099030  98.90097  0.000000 
4  1.418046  96.82325  1.758707  3.789984  96.18779  0.022223 
8  2.676919  93.01603  4.307050  6.791105  93.04929  0.159609 
12  3.223317  91.49613  5.280556  7.981458  91.77073  0.247812 
20  3.501586  90.95756  5.540850  8.793665  90.79196  0.414371 
30  3.566082  90.85069  5.583232  9.150702  90.35322  0.496081 
Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: Variance Decomposition of Inflation Due to: 
Period World GDP Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
World GDP 
Shocks Supply Shocks 
Demand 
Shocks 
1  0.124065  0.246888  99.62905  0.030485  0.008646  99.96087 
4  0.460843  2.260634  97.27852  1.068879  0.375578  98.55554 
8  2.866493  6.197755  90.93575  3.043479  0.575072  96.38145 
12  3.572738  6.788654  89.63861  3.209379  0.592822  96.19780 
20  3.567315  6.762468  89.67022  3.246050  0.614153  96.13980 
30  3.554947  6.746145  89.69891  3.247690  0.632784  96.11953 
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Table 3 
Partial Correlation Analysis 
No. Country Supply Demand 
1. Algeria 0.28 
(2.97) 
-0.28 
 (-2.90) 
2. Benin 0.18 
 (1.87) 
-0.11 
 (-1.12) 
3 Botswana 0.53 
 (6.22) 
-0.40  
(-4.36) 
4. Cameroon 0.08  
(0.81) 
-0.08 
 (-0.81) 
5. Central Africa -0.26  
(-2.65) 
0.22 
 (2.27) 
6. Egypt 0.39 
 (4.25) 
-0.36 
 (-3.83) 
7. Ethiopia 0.28 
 (2.92) 
-0.35 
 (-3.78) 
8. Gabon 0.08 
 (0.82) 
0.22  
(2.25) 
9. Ghana 0.59 
 (7.30) 
-0.69  
(-9.61) 
10. Kenya 0.04 
 (0.40) 
-0.03 
 (-0.26) 
11. Libya 0.48  
(5.50) 
-0.50  
(-5.67) 
12. Malawi 0.94 
 (27.96) 
-0.95 
 (-30.05 
13. Mauritania 0.17 
 (1.69) 
-0.16 
 (-1.67) 
14. Mauritius 0.75 
 (11.23) 
-0.76 
 (-11.63) 
15. Morocco -0.44 
 (-4.94) 
0.46  
(5.26) 
16. Nigeria 0.47  
(5.35) 
-0.51 
 (-5.94) 
17. Senegal 0.01 
 (0.09) 
-0.01 
 (-0.12) 
18. South Africa 0.46 
 (5.43) 
-0.50 
 (-5.73) 
19. Tanzania 0.23 
 (2.42) 
-0.23  
(-2.32) 
20. Tunisia 0.21 
 (2.17) 
-0.18 
 (-1.83) 
21. Uganda 0.53  
(6.23) 
-0.45 
 (-5.09) 
22. Zambia 0.39 
 (4.30) 
-0.52 
 (-6.11) 
Figures in the parenthesis are t-ratios 
 
